Law and Sex by Whitman, Christina B.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Reviews Faculty Scholarship 
1988 
Law and Sex 
Christina B. Whitman 
University of Michigan Law School, cwhitman@umich.edu 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/reviews/43 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/reviews 
 Part of the Law and Gender Commons, Law and Society Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory 
Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Whitman, Christina B. "Law and Sex." Review of Feminism Unmodified, by C. A. MacKinnon. Mich. L. Rev. 
86 (1988): 1388-403. 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Reviews by an authorized administrator of 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
LAW AND SEX
Christina B. Whitman *
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW. By Ca-
tharine A. MacKinnon. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
1987. Pp. 315. Cloth, $25.; paper, $9.95.
In Feminism Unmodified, a collection of speeches given between
1981 and 1986, Catharine MacKinnon talks of law from the perspec-
tive of feminism. MacKinnon does not approach her topic as a lawyer
with a uniquely legal perspective on feminism; she brings, instead, a
distinctively feminist approach to law. Nor is the feminism from
which she speaks grounded in the standard political theories: Mac-
Kinnon disclaims and attacks the Marxist approach to feminism, the
socialist approach to feminism, and, most emphatically and repeat-
edly, the liberal approach to feminism that has been embraced by
many lawyers in their effort to use law to eliminate discrimination on
the basis of sex. MacKinnon's goal is to define feminism on its own
terms. That is what she means by "unmodified." This book both ex-
emplifies and discusses the difficulty, and the considerable success, of
her project. It is a rough, powerful, important work.
MacKinnon talks about law, and about the effect upon women of
trying to talk in legal language. Although she herself is, in at least
some of these essays, talking to lawyers, and although lawyers typi-
cally adopt a language of neutrality, MacKinnon herself makes no pre-
tense of neutrality or disinterest. These are political speeches. They
are concerned with the way law works as a system of power, a system
that reinforces the supremacy of men over women. To adopt the lan-
guage of law as if it represented not politics, but neutrality or a claim
to a disinterested justice, would be to give up her claim from the begin-
ning. It would cede to law the very status she contests. Yet the costs
of MacKinnon's choice to talk about law from the standpoint of femi-
nist politics - the personal and political costs, particularly the loss of
credibility - are high. That is a chief theme of this book:
My work is considered not law by lawyers, not scholarship by academ-
ics, too practical by intellectuals, too intellectual by practitioners, and
neither politics nor science by political scientists.
... [A]s for me, I notice that law gives me some credibility, but that
being woman-identified takes it away. The law gives male credibility;
female identification erases it. [pp. 132-33]
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1968, M.A. 1970, J.D. 1974
University of Michigan. - Ed.
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How do you persuade as a feminist lawyer? Must you choose be-
tween a language of neutrality, which provides credibility but disables
you from saying those things you most need to say, and a feminist
language, which allows you to say those things at the cost of being
believed? In MacKinnon's view, a central tactic of male supremacy is
to deny credibility to women who speak as women. The central task
of feminism is, in the face of this, to articulate a woman's point of
view. The law has responded to the voice of the disempowered in the
past. MacKinnon calls on it to do so once again.
The speeches in this collection build upon two earlier, more formal
articles, both published in Signs. 1 In these articles MacKinnon began
to elaborate her view of the explanatory power and distinctive method-
ology of feminism. This methodology, consciousness-raising, consists
most basically in believing women's descriptions of their own experi-
ence. It also requires of women, however privileged they may be, that
they identify with women, that they remain loyal to and accountable
to women, rather than to the system that has given them a compara-
tive advantage (p. 77). When you listen to women, MacKinnon testi-
fies, the world assumed by law does not exist (p. 169). What is left out
by law is the systematic domination of women by men in public and,
most importantly, in private life. That domination, MacKinnon ar-
gues, is based on sex: "[F]eminism is built on believing women's ac-
counts of sexual use and abuse by men" (p. 5).
Two-thirds of the essays in Feminism Unmodified apply the per-
spective of women to specific legal questions. From that perspective,
much that is not currently perceived as harm based on sex, or even as
harm at all, becomes visible as sex discrimination. An example - one
in which MacKinnon's efforts in making discrimination visible as dis-
crimination have already achieved remarkable legal success - is sex-
ual harassment. From a male perspective, sexual harassment is not
the infliction of an injury, but a natural biological response. From a
perspective that claims to be untainted by gender, to be objective and
neutral, sexual harassment might not look like sex discrimination if
both men and women are harassed, or if both find the tactics offen-
sive.2 From a woman's point of view, sexual harassment is one of
many instances in which women are treated in a degrading, demeaning
manner because of their sex. It is a way of reinforcing women's
subordinate status. Ten years ago MacKinnon wrote a book in which
1. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS:
J. WOMEN CULTURE & Socy. 515 (1982) [hereinafter Feminism, Marxism, Part 1]; MacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J.
'WOMEN CULTURE & Socy. 635 (1983) [hereinafter Feminism, Marxism, Part 2].
2. E.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct.
1983 (1987).
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she argued that sexual harassment was a practice of sex discrimina-
tion.3 This characterization, which was greeted with much skepticism
when it was first articulated, now has been accepted, without dissent,
by the Supreme Court.4
Repeatedly in this collection of speeches, MacKinnon redescribes
as sex discrimination practices which have been thought of as neutral,
objective, or based on biological differences. A key part of this argu-
ment is her critique of the law's approach to questions of inequality.
The great gains in legal equality made by women since the early 1970s
rest in large part on the argument that women should be treated the
same as men to the extent that they are the same as men. Since many
women, at least those educated like men, seem to be the same as men
for most public purposes, this argument has been tremendously effec-
tive in breaking down barriers created by reliance on stereotypes and
overgeneralizations. The lawyers who made this claim appealed to an
image of women as autonomous, independent, and as capable of ac-
complishment as any man. This strategy has been most effective in
gaining women access to previously segregated institutions. To close
the door to these independent, fully capable women would be
irrational.
The strategy creates problems when the grounds for difference in
treatment are fertility, or pregnancy, or women's responsibility for
child care, for discrimination on these bases appears to reflect real dif-
ferences and thus to be "rational." To the extent that lawyers arguing
on behalf of women insist that women be treated like men in spite of
pregnancy or reproductive potential, their claims, under the equality
analysis, look like a request for affirmative action or preferential treat-
ment. The capacity to bear children becomes a difference from men, a
disability, something to be compensated for, rather than something
that is a valuable part of one way of being human.
MacKinnon treats the legal strategies which focus on similarity
and difference between the sexes as a single strategy with "two alter-
nate paths to equality" - "be the same as men," or gender neutrality;
and "be different from men," or special protection (p. 33). What the
two paths share is the assumption that questions of equality are to be
approached by comparing women to men: "Concealed is the substan-
tive way in which man has become the measure of all things" (p. 34).
This legal strategy, the "differences approach," assumes that legal
questions of equality can be resolved by logic, without reference to
politics. MacKinnon associates this effort to avoid politics with liber-
alism's assumption that all adults, men and women, are free from co-
ercion in the absence of government interference, able to make choices
3. C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX Dis-
CRIMINATION (1979).
4. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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completely voluntarily and to determine their life direction. The legal
strategy, the liberal assumption that underlies it, and the feminists
who make claims in these terms, are the main objects of attack in her
book.
MacKinnon argues that gender discrimination is a question of
dominance, rather than of distinction: "To feminism, equality means
the aspiration to eradicate not gender differentiation, but gender hier-
archy" (p. 22). The systematic subordination of women by men can-
not be solved by drawing more appropriate distinctions. Just as the
legal arguments made by liberal feminists drew on precedent from race
cases that challenged segregation and exclusion by refusing to permit
classifications based on race,5 MacKinnon points to precedent from
race discrimination law that describes the problem as "white
supremacy," rather than irrational differentiation. 6 Even though the
attention of feminist lawyers in the 1970s was directed primarily at the
exclusion of women from male institutions, segregation, MacKinnon
argues, is not at the core of women's problems. MacKinnon is much
more concerned with what happens when women live with men.
MacKinnon's approach, which sees the achievement of equality as
tied essentially to the overthrow of male dominance and gender hierar-
chy, assumes that men and women are different in a system of male
supremacy. The "differences approach" leads to a dead end, for it is
insensitive to the way in which gender differences are socially con-
structed. Women are not "similarly situated" in our society - specifi-
cally, they are not autonomous and independent. Liberal feminism
assumes that, once the stereotypes are swept away, we will have left
only some irreducible biological differences in gender that can be ra-
tionally taken into account because they reflect differentiation that is
neither inaccurate nor irrational. MacKinnon argues that nothing,
not even biology, is irreducible in that way. The so-called biological
differences among the sexes are given meaning - in fact, created - by
social practices, including the practices of law (p. 173). This is not the
familiar argument that we cannot know what is attributable to biology
until we eliminate social inequities. MacKinnon asserts that we can-
not get beyond social readings of gender to an unbiased, neutral view
of difference. The key question then becomes: What has been the so-
cial construction of sex differences, and how has the law contributed
to it?
MacKinnon's position is that the key to understanding the social
meaning of gender, and thus the key to understanding male domi-
nance, is what society has made of sex. The link between dominance
and sex is simple and direct: We have been taught to believe that
5. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. (10 Otto) 303 (1880).
6. P. 42. MacKinnon cites Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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women enjoy sexual dominance, that they are naturally subordinate in
this most basic of biological activities and therefore naturally
subordinate in all aspects of life. In linking dominance with sex,
rather than with economic or class interests, 7 or with psychological
conditioning,8 MacKinnon has been powerfully influenced by the
work of the philosopher and novelist, Andrea Dworkin (pp. 129-31,
149, 173). In Dworkin's analysis "sexuality itself is a social construct,
gendered to the ground. Male dominance... is not an artificial over-
lay upon an underlying inalterable substratum of uncorrupted essen-
tial sexual being" (p. 149). The social construct of sexuality is that
women are objects for male use. One consequence of "believing
women's accounts of sexual use and abuse by men" is to blur the dis-
tinction that the law has drawn between impermissible forms of domi-
nance, such as rape, and everyday relationships between men and
women. The testimony that MacKinnon hears, from women "who
have lived through or worked hands-on with violence against women,"
from former prostitutes, and from former pornography victims like
Linda Marchiano, capture more of women's situation for MacKinnon
than does most feminist writing (pp. 216-17). In one of her Signs arti-
cles, MacKinnon has argued that the legal definition of rape legiti-
mates the forcing of sex upon women. It does so by defining rape from
a male point of view, as consisting of those forms of coercion that the
men in the legislatures are unlikely to use.9 Sex that does not fit into
the legal definition of rape is assumed to be consented to, to be volun-
tary. But the legal definition, MacKinnon argues, ignores most of the
ways in which sex is actually forced upon women. These include, but
are not limited to, economic coercion, the more subtle physical coer-
cion created by limited options and women's trained passivity, and
violence assumed to be consented to because the woman did not
scream and fight, as well as the pervasive coercion that flows from
being called frigid, or repressed, or anti-male, if a woman says no.
Some of the most cherished victories of the women's movement are
called into question by MacKinnon's description of male supremacy.
For example, she redescribes the significance of Roe v. Wade, '0 the
case that held state prohibitions of abortion to be unconstitutional.
7. MacKinnon rejects those theories that "appl[y] the objectivist strain in marxism to women
and call[ ] that marxist feminism." P. 60. But she draws upon another strain in Marxism, one
which "is more critical of the necessary situatedness of its own standpoint." P. 59. She describes
her approach as "methodologically postmarxist" in that it "treats women as a social group." P.
60. MacKinnon's argument that "the molding, direction, and expression of sexuality organize
society into two sexes" is explicitly parallel to the Marxist analysis of society as fundamentally
constructed of the relations of people through work. Pp. 48-49.
8. MacKinnon criticizes theorists such as Carol Gilligan and Susan Griffin, who build upon
psychological analyses of women's situation in order to identify some "real" woman's perspective
or sexuality that exists outside of and is distorted by male culture. Pp. 38-39, 148-49.
9. Feminism, Marxism, Part 2, supra note 1, at 646-55.
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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The Supreme Court in Roe based its decision on a theory of freedom of
choice in private matters, rather than a theory of sex discrimination.
MacKinnon challenges this reasoning, which assumes that women are
free to make choices about private matters unless they are subject to
government coercion." MacKinnon argues that it is in private mat-
ters that women may be least free. Again, the comparison to men as a
standard has skewed the legal question: "the equality issue has been
framed as a struggle for women to have sex with men on the same
terms as men: 'without consequences'" (p. 98). The result, although
it has undoubtedly helped many desperate women, has also furthered
male power over women: "So long as women do not control access to
our sexuality, abortion facilitates women's heterosexual availability.
In other words, under conditions of gender inequality, sexual libera-
tion in this sense does not free women; it frees male sexual aggression"
(p. 99). A decision that looks like a victory for feminism also serves -
may have been possible only because it also serves - the dominance of
man.
Both the arguments in support of Roe and the arguments against it
assume that the normal, typical, sexual relationship between men and
women in our society grows out of the free choice of both parties.
MacKinnon argues that that is true only from a male perspective. For
women, sex is almost universally compulsory. And what sex means,
what it acts out, is domination by men and submission by women. It
is not a sufficient answer to this claim to point out that many women
enjoy sex. MacKinnon would respond that they are trained to that
preference, and that it is not surprising that women try to make the
best of their situation. The real power of MacKinnon's claim turns
not on individual preferences, but on the social meaning of sex. For a
man, sex is consistent with, even essential to, a public image of power
and prestige. For a woman, sex is inconsistent with authority; it is a
sign that someone has exercised power over her. Socially, sex is not
seen as enhancing a woman in her various roles, but as defining her
limitation to a single role. The social meaning captures what MacKin-
non asserts: that sex is forced on women. In elaborating what sex
means to women, MacKinnon links women across class lines. For
poor women, forced sex may take the form of economic coercion into
abusive marriages, unwanted pregnancies, pornography, and prostitu-
tion. Elite women may or may not have more economic indepen-
dence, but they too, MacKinnon argues, are victimized because of
their sexual identity.
Because sexuality and its social meaning as dominance and subor-
11. The Court's rationale, unlike MacKinnon's, would find no inconsistency between the
result in Roe and a government refusal to fund abortions, for the latter involves no government
coercion of choice. The Court so held in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
May 1988]
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dination are central to MacKinnon's theory, the practices that create
that meaning are first on MacKinnon's agenda for legal change. Fore-
most among those practices, she argues, is pornography. MacKinnon
argues that pornography, like sexual harassment, is a manifestation of
sex discrimination. Like rape, pornography is not separate from nor-
mal sexual relations. In fact, MacKinnon claims, pornography is a
cause of sex discrimination, and it determines sexual relations. Al-
most half of Feminism Unmodified is about pornography. Her cri-
tique, which builds explicitly and with admiration on the work of
Andrea Dworkin, 12 may change forever the way in which the subject
is viewed by lawyers. It is also the area in which MacKinnon is most
under attack in her claim to be speaking for women.
Before Dworkin and MacKinnon came on the scene, the law, most
liberals, and most lawyers regarded pornography from the point of
view of the pornographer; pornography was primarily a question of
free speech, and the essential harm was that inflicted by government
censorship upon the speaker. MacKinnon looks at pornography from
the point of view of the woman who is the subject of the
pornographer's speech. From this perspective, what is troubling is not
obscenity, bad taste, or offensiveness. What is troubling is pornogra-
phy's subordination of women. MacKinnon is not simply concerned
with violent pornography, for the very concept of violence incorpo-
rates a male standard of what is coercive. Pornography that portrays
sex as violence toward women is a large part of the problem, but vio-
lence is only one way in which women are subordinated (p. 187).
MacKinnon is also concerned about pornography that dehumanizes
women and pornography that portrays humiliation or submission as
central to the sexual role of women.' 3
Defined this way, pornography is the central practice of male
supremacy. It illustrates the link that MacKinnon sees between male
dominance and sexuality. Pornography legitimates the domination of
women by men by making this domination appear natural, an expres-
sion of innate sexual urges in both the man and the woman. It defines
what is thought to be sexual freedom, and teaches that it is acceptable
for men to dominate women because women, biologically, enjoy being
dominated (p. 91). Pornography teaches what sex is and what women
are. The prevalence of similar messages in nonpornographic areas of
12. Pp. 129-31. Dworkin's basic work on the subject is PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING
WOMEN (1981).
13. Under her definition, pornography is "the graphic sexually explicit subordination of
women through pictures or words that also includes women dehumanized as sexual objects,
things, or commodities; enjoying pain or humiliation or rape; being tied up, cut up, mutilated,
bruised, or physically hurt; in postures of sexual submission or servility or display; reduced to
body parts, penetrated by objects or animals, or presented in scenarios of degradation, injury,
torture; shown as filthy or inferior; bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these
conditions sexual." P. 176.
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society, such as advertising and art, only reinforces MacKinnon's
point that "normal" sex has been created in pornography's image.
MacKinnon's legal response is an ordinance, drafted by MacKinnon
and Dworkin, which gives women who can establish that they have
been injured in the production of, or as a consequence of, pornogra-
phy, a cause of action against the pornographer, and, in some cases, a
right to have the material removed from the market. By casting the
legal action as a civil rights suit brought by the victim,14 rather than as
government-initiated regulation, the MacKinnon-Dworkin proposal
builds the woman's perspective into the legal process. The harm to the
individual woman who is in the courtroom as the plaintiff is the center
of the suit.
The first amendment objections to the ordinance have prevailed in
court, 15 but MacKinnon challenges these constitutional constraints as
reflecting, again, a male perspective. First amendment law, she ar-
gues, protects individuals against government oppression because that
oppression is what men fear (p. 207). It assumes that in the absence of
government coercion, the speaker can say whatever is on his mind,
that freedom from the state is total freedom. Women's experience is
different. Their oppression takes place in private, and it comes from
men rather than from the state. "[T]he free speech of men," in partic-
ular the speech of pornographers, "silences the free speech of women"
(p. 156). It discourages women from speaking, and when they speak it
makes what they say not credible. To the extent that the core first
amendment value is tolerance of others' views, it is a habit of mind
that women do not need to learn. Women are trained to be tolerant of
and to adapt to male ways of seeing the world. What women need to
achieve is the confidence to insist on their own voice.
In form as well as in content, this book is about speaking from
women's experience and the effort to achieve credibility for what is
said. This is an issue of immediate, as well as theoretical, importance
for MacKinnon. In Feminism Unmodified her ideas are not presented
as a finished whole. Instead, they are developed over time, through
speeches which begin tentatively in the early 1980s and build through-
out the decade toward more certainty and more anger. In her earliest
essays, for example, she is uncertain about the proper response to por-
nography.' 6 Four years later, after innumerable debates over her ordi-
14. The version of the ordinance adopted by the city of Indianapolis also permitted suits by
men, children, or transsexuals who could "prove injury in the same way that a woman is in-
jured." INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CITY-CouNTY GENERAL ORDINANCE No. 35 16-17(b) (1984),
quoted at p. 294.
15. American Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), affd., 771
F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
16. Censoring pornography has not delegitimized it; I want to delegitimize it. What
would do that is unclear to me at this time. Maybe there is a way. There needs to be. It is
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nance, and after watching its quick demise at the hands of the federal
courts, she is furious - at the federal judges 17 and, even more so, at
other women, particularly women lawyers, who claim to speak as fem-
inists yet oppose her proposal. We see how her ideas and her speaking
strategies develop in response to responses, and in many different con-
texts, before groups with a variety of agendas.
It is not clear whether the versions of the speeches that appear in
the book represent written texts from which MacKinnon would speak,
or whether they are transcripts from taped presentations. Some seem
quite clearly to be texts written for publication, others are so full of
references to the particular occasion that they seem to have been put
down undigested on the page. She says that "they were all spoken first
without a written text," though some were later revised (p. 1). They
are all deliberate political acts, as well as essays in theory. The most
formal is the Biddle lecture given at Harvard in April of 1984. Others
are portions of panel discussions in which MacKinnon participated,
with the contributions of the other panelists excised, but with an occa-
sional brief question from the floor included. There seems to have
been virtually no editing for publication. There is considerable repeti-
tion; and there are some frustrating omissions. Occasionally MacKin-
non refers to positions that other people have taken in the course of
the conference or panel discussion at which the speech was given, or to
political maneuverings that preceded her speech, but these are not ex-
plained in any detail. Even when her speech is a fierce attack on an-
other perspective, as in On Collaboration, she seems so suspicious of
her opponents' arguments and motives that she does not communicate
what they are saying. Despite occasional statements by MacKinnon
that she is interested in dialogue (e.g., p. 46), hers is the only voice that
you hear in these pages. The voices of other women are included only
through MacKinnon's retelling of their stories or her fury at their
failings.
MacKinnon is simultaneously mesmerizing and infuriating. She is
provocative, grating, moving, defensive, devastating, repetitive, relent-
less. Even her written words often capture the passion and cadence of
a preacher. Although she is explicitly political, she refuses to conform
to the expectations of any particular style of discourse, even the dis-
course of conventional politics. One of her characteristic techniques is
to build an argument elliptically, through a chain that appeals to an
understanding of connections that are developed more fully elsewhere:
not that I think the state can't do anything for women in this area. I think making sexual
harassment sex discrimination has helped delegitimize sexual harassment. That is as far as I
have gotten with the problem at this time.
P. 140.
17. "My best guess is that [the MacKinnon-Dworkin pornography] law takes the point of
view that women do not enjoy and deserve rape, and [Judge Easterbrook] saw that as just one
point of view among many." P. 211.
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"Pornography turns sex inequality into sexuality and turns male domi-
nance into the sex difference.... [P]ornography makes inequality into
sex, which makes it enjoyable, and into gender, which makes it seem
natural" (p. 3). She is witty, and funny, and sharp: "Lawyers consid-
ering whether anything can be done for a woman ... rarely conclude
that they should confront or change the law. They look at cases the
way surfers look at waves" (p. 13). And: "[T]o consider 'no more
rape' as only a negative, no more than an absence, shows a real failure
of imagination. Why does 'out now' contain a sufficiently positive vi-
sion of the future for Vietnam and Nicaragua but not for women" (p.
219)? MacKinnon exaggerates, though not without basis, 18 and she
makes her points through redefining terms in surprisingly broad,
though not inaccurate, ways.19 She is deliberately shocking: "Pornog-
raphy strips and devastates women of credibility, from our accounts of
sexual assault to our everyday reality of sexual subordination ...
Even if she can form words, who listens to a woman with a penis in
her mouth" (p. 193)? She can be conclusory and vague. She plays
language games. For example, the word "pornography" becomes a
verb, something that is done to women, as in "[t]he film Deep Throat,
in which Linda was pornographed. . ." (p. 128). Perhaps MacKin-
non's most distinctive pattern is the juxtaposition of extremely aca-
demic, abstract arguments with crisp, biting sentences:
Along with the rape and prostitution in which it participates, porhogra-
phy institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy, which fuses the
erotization of dominance and submission with the social construction of
male and female. Gender is sexual. Pornography constitutes the mean-
ing of that sexuality. Men treat women as who they see women as being.
Pornography constructs who that is. Men's power over women means
that the way men see women defines who women can be. Pornography
is that way. [p. 148]
For MacKinnon, speaking for women means speaking about sex,
specifically, about sex as forced upon women. Feminism Unmodified
is about credibility - about the credibility of women who testify to
sexual abuse, and about MacKinnon's own credibility when she speaks
for these women. Her point is that the very effort to speak about these
matters in this way calls into question the credibility of the speaker.
18. For example, she describes an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ruling that a
sexual harassment complainant had not met the burden of proof without a corroborating witness
as saying "a woman's word is worthless. Usually all the man has is his denial." P. 113.
19. For example, she asks why she is not believed when she says that "only 7.8 percent of
women have never been sexually assaulted." P. 171. Her figure "includes all the forms of rape
or other sexual abuse or harassment... noncontact as well as contact, from gang rape by stran-
gers to obscene phone calls, unwanted sexual advances on the street, unwelcome requests to pose
for pornography, and subjection to peeping Toms and sexual exhibitionists (flashers)." P. 233.
Under this definition it is amazing that any woman has escaped from sexual assault. But Mac-
Kinnon's point is made: Women feel that they have not been victims of sexual assault only
because they accept so much of it as "normal", as something that must simply be tolerated to get
along in the world.
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That is one of the damaging effects that she attributes to pornography
(p. 193). In her most recent speeches and in the afterword, where she
writes directly about her experiences as a speaker, MacKinnon strug-
gles explicitly with the hostility, the dismissals, and the attacks that
her lectures have elicited. She is most concerned, perhaps because
most surprised, when those attacks have come from women.
For the past two decades, feminist theory has elaborated upon the
basic insight that "the personal is political." MacKinnon's claim is to
have captured the essential meaning of that phrase in drawing the con-
nection between political power, manifested in the system of male
supremacy, and the sexual relations between men and women. Femi-
nism Unmodified is an elaboration of the consequences of drawing that
connection. But it is also an .exploration of the connections between
the "personal" and the "political" in another sense. In these essays,
which are the texts of political speeches, MacKinnon is often very per-
sonal. One of her strategies is to engage her audience and her foes
directly by naming names and making personal accusations. 20 She
also addresses explicitly, throughout the time period of these
speeches, 21 the hostile reactions that have been directed against her
and her colleagues personally. One not uncommon response to
MacKinnon's tactics, especially among people exposed to these ideas
for the first time, is to try to evade the political point by focusing on
the person of the speaker - to ask whether she likes sex, or to specu-
late about her sexual preference.
Why do MacKinnon's essays evoke not only disagreement, but
such extreme hostility? Why are they so unsettling, even to people
who are committed feminists?
Despite her evident distress and even surprise at the strength of the
resistance she has encountered, MacKinnon would say that the resist-
ance simply establishes the force of her argument. She is correct. It is
dangerous for a woman to speak about sex and to call it coerced. At
best, what she says will be trivialized - for instance, reduced to a
debate about her own sexual practices. At worst, she will be hounded
and hated. The very strength of the negative reaction becomes evi-
dence of one of MacKinnon's main themes: that it is important to
those who have a stake in the existing system that women's point of
view be denied credibility.
MacKinnon claims that the legitimacy she gains through law is
taken away because of her identification as a woman (pp. 132-33). But
part of the problem - this is another one of her themes - is that she
cannot simultaneously identify herself as a woman and as a lawyer in
any conventional sense. She would claim that the things she has to say
20. See, e.g., pp. 141-42, p. 260 nn.13-14 (Professor Charles Nesson); p. 220 (Judge Ellen
Bree Bums).
21. See, eg., pp. 132-33 (from 1982); p. 209 (from 1986).
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cannot fully be said in lawyers' language. To some extent, her argu-
ments can be made with traditional legal techniques. She can point to
analogous claims that have been recognized by the courts in the past,
especially in the racial discrimination cases. In those cases, harms that
were once ignored have been made visible. More specifically, Mac-
Kinnon rejects the legal strategy that holds up the ideal of a gender-
blind system, and, in doing so, she can rely on the acceptance in race
cases of the idea that a color-blind government is inadequate to
achieve true equality after centuries of abusive treatment.22
But in many significant ways, MacKinnon deliberately refuses to
speak like a lawyer, or even like a traditional academic. She refuses to
feign neutrality or disinterest. She even refuses to make a pretense of
stating the other side's position. She claims that the matters of which
she speaks are not matters about which one can or should be neutral
and objective, that the standards of objectivity and neutrality are tech-
niques used to conceal the fact that reality has been constructed from
the male point of view. In a world created according to the male point
of view there is no way that one can talk about what happens to
women without sounding strident and hysterical - that is the way in
which the testimony of women is made unbelievable. Again, the very
hostility MacKinnon evokes becomes evidence in support of her claim.
MacKinnon's analysis is powerful and coherent. But she has made
other choices as well, choices not so obviously required by her agenda.
She is often offensive and cruel to individuals and groups who disagree
with her. This is one way in which she refuses to respect the line
between the personal and the political. One of the last essays in this
collection is called On Collaboration. It is not about MacKinnon's
collaboration with Andrea Dworkin, Linda Marchiano, and other
women whom she repeatedly and graciously acknowledges throughout
this book. It is about collaboration in the World War II sense. The
essay is directed at women lawyers who do not support MacKinnon's
proposed pornography ordinance. These women are not called
"women lawyers," or "feminists," except with a sneer (pp. 200, 202).
They are called, repeatedly, "women lawyers who identify as femi-
nist."' 23 MacKinnon is a woman who has found anger empowering,
and she is angry at those who find anger debilitating, or who are not
22. The Supreme Court agrees with MacKinnon. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Assn. v.
Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 693-94 (1987).
23. E.g., pp. 201, 202, 205.
What law school does for you is this: it tells you that to become a lawyer means to forget
your feelings, forget your community, most of all, if you are a woman, forget your experi-
ence. Become a maze-bright rat. Women lawyers as a group have not been much of an
exception to this, except that they go dead in the eyes like ghetto children, unlike the men,
who come out of law school glowing in the dark. Women who defend the pornographers
are defending a source of their relatively high position among women under male
supremacy, keeping all women, including them, an inferior class on the basis of sex, en-
forced by sexual force.
... I ... really want you on our side. But, failing that, I want you to stop claiming that
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driven by the same anger. To her, those women seem less courageous.
It may well be impossible to talk about what MacKinnon has to talk
about without being angry, very angry, but it is not theoretically clear
that one must also be cruel.
The cruelty in MacKinnon's voice may serve a purpose. It com-
municates her view that the stakes are high and that action must be
taken. It refuses to allow the reader to fall back on neutrality; it insists
on a reaction. It refuses to adhere to the line between emotion and
intellect. But one unfortunate consequence of her anger is to muddy
the effectiveness of her point about credibility. Resistance to what she
has to say can be explained as itself resistance to dominance, resistance
to MacKinnon's own bullying tone, rather than as a refusal to hear
testimony from the experience of women.
There is another, more troubling way in which resistance to
MacKinnon feels like resistance to dominance. MacKinnon claims to
speak for women, to be articulating a "woman's point of view," yet she
is not listening to all women.24 Some women are not worth listening
to because they have been given access to power, and they have chosen
to "defend... their relatively high position among women under male
supremacy" (p. 205). Others are indifferent because of "sexual self-
interest" (p. 14). At the beginning of the 1980s, MacKinnon is tenta-
tive in her claims about pornography. But four years later, women
who oppose her ordinance are "siding with the pornographers" (p.
205).
As MacKinnon ruefully acknowledges, "To put it mildly, people
take sex personally" (p. 218). And not all women would accept
MacKinnon's characterization of sex as representing their perspective.
Women, as well as men, do not want to be told what sex is for them.
MacKinnon's response, which is powerful, is that those women who
do not agree with her description of what sex is under conditions of
male supremacy are not being sufficiently critical about the ways in
which their own preferences have been formed by their limited op-
tions. They "are trying to make the best of a situation that they think
(not without reason) they cannot change" (p. 14).
The issue of who speaks for women, and as women, arises in other
contexts. Indeed, the claim of the book is to have articulated the only
pure, "unmodified," feminism - the only feminism uncorrupted by
male theories and perspectives. However compelling MacKinnon's
your liberalism, with its elitism, and your Freudianism, with its sexualized misogyny, has
anything in common with feminism.
P. 205.
24. The opening essay, appropriately enough, represents MacKinnon's side of a debate with
Phyllis Schlafly and raises immediately the question of which of them speaks on behalf of wo-
men. MacKinnon handles this gracefully and powerfully, by making the case that Schlafly has
been underappreciated by her own political colleagues, that Schlafly has herself been a victim of
discrimination. Pp. 29-30.
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theory may be, and I think it very compelling, it is unfair to ask wo-
men to accept a single perspective about either feminism or sex. Wo-
men have had too much practice in accepting a position that has been
handed to them. As MacKinnon, despite her certainty about her own
position, does understand (p. 48), we are in the middle of the project of
describing what life has been and is for women. One of the great
pleasures of feminist theory has been that it complicates accepted
views by adding previously unheard perspectives. It is not yet time for
women to give themselves over to a single, even though new, descrip-
tion. And it is especially troubling that in so much of what MacKin-
non says she seeks to distance herself from women who disagree.
Women have also had too much practice in being the Other.
To a disturbing extent, MacKinnon has borrowed from the tools of
male dominance in her writing. There is the occasional abstruse, aca-
demic sentence. There is the claim to truth, or at least to the correct
theoretical perspective. And there is cruelty. It is true that she uses
these tools in the service of ideas that are just beginning to be heard in
our culture, especially in our legal culture. Her aggression is explicitly
in the service of bias and argument, of a particular perspective; she
does not disguise her political claim as a description of the natural,
and inevitable, order of human life. Moreover, even though her effort
to include the voice of women seems to exclude some women's per-
spectives, the testimony she does include comes from the least power-
ful, and thus least heard, women in our society. But ironically,
MacKinnon's argument may be most effective among academics, who
can appreciate its insight, its intelligence, and its coherence, and
among lawyers, who understand the need for action and the need to
argue from a particular position for specific change. It may be least
effective politically among the general population, for its divisiveness
and anger will seem like more of the same male politics to many
women who will not listen long enough to question whether they have
been trained to be suspicious of women who refuse to be conciliatory.
MacKinnon raises the uncomfortable question of what feminist poli-
tics must be to be effective.
Finally, I think that there is a way of misreading MacKinnon that
both evokes hostility from some and misdirects the attention of others
whom she has moved and persuaded. One criticism of MacKinnon is
that she must not like sex. Another is that she must hate men. These
are interesting charges. Again, the mere fact that they are made sup-
ports MacKinnon's basic thesis: Why are the charges relevant, even if
true? And, in particular, why does it cast doubt on what a woman has
to say if she shows contempt for men, when we have shown so much
tolerance for men who express contempt for women? To say that a
woman hates men is to cast doubt on her rationality and her judg-
ment. But similar comments about women from Oxford dons or
White House aides indicate at the most bad taste, a certain unfortu-
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nate crudeness, rather than lack of fitness for office. We live in a soci-
ety in which it is acceptable to disparage women, but unacceptable to
disparage men.
In any case, MacKinnon cannot be charged with contempt for
men. Nor can she be taken to urge feminists to become separatists or
to forgo all sexual relations with men. To read her in either way is to
trivialize what she means by "[t]he personal is political." She takes
care to make it clear that she is not talking about individual men, even
when she mentions them by name (pp. 164, 212). She is concerned
about the injuries that pornography does to men as well as to women
(p. 189). MacKinnon is not claiming a biological ground for men any
more than for women. She is talking instead about what men have
been trained to be and about what they have to gain from their place
in the social hierarchy. The difference between men and women "is
that men have power and women do not" (p. 51). Here is MacKinnon
speaking to men directly, in a speech given at a rally held "to grieve
and protest a series of rapes" (p. 81):
I think you need to remember that we love you. And that as a result it's
often very unclear to us why you are so urgent. It's unclear to us why
you are so pressured in seeking sexual access to us. We want you not to
denigrate us if we refuse. We want you to support us, to listen to us, and
to back off a little. Maybe to back off a lot. [p. 83]
And MacKinnon acknowledges her desire for what sex can be: "a
sexuality of one's own yet with another, both of whom are equally
present because yes is meaningful because no is meaningful" (p. 217).
The problem, she says, is that "many people want to believe they al-
ready have this more than they want to have it" (p. 217).
The point of seeing the political implications of our personal, sex-
ual relations is precisely to emphasize the political. The point is that
there is no "private," noncoerced sphere of choice for women (p. 100).
It is easiest to respond to MacKinnon's characterization of male-fe-
male relationships by trying to work out the best one possible in your
own life. That is no small achievement. But to read MacKinnon that
way is to trivialize her message. She does not mean to offer a blueprint
for individual relations. She is talking about sex, but she is talking
about it in order to bring about political change. That is why pornog-
raphy comes so high on her agenda. She sees making pornographers
pay their victims as a way to redistribute wealth and political power,
as well as a way to change the language which legitimizes power rela-
tions. The point is to see how power and politics structure what seems
to be only personal, and how political and legal action may be a path
to change. MacKinnon does have a personal message for women, but
it is not about better sex. It is a demand upon women with power in
our society, a claim that they see what they have in common with less
powerful women.
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We are in a time in which it is hard to see the common interest of
women. Some women have been able to move into positions of pres-
tige, influence, and wealth. They have the education, the money, the
intellectual skills, the confidence, and the opportunities that used to be
reserved for men. Other women are, if anything, worse off than they
ever were. They are thrown by economic circumstance into prostitu-
tion and pornography, or confined by economic and other fears to
marriages with abusive husbands. Or they are poor and isolated in
households and communities of unskilled and uneducated women and
children. MacKinnon belongs to the empowered group. She is a
woman who has power and opportunity, but her political mission is to
articulate what it feels like for women who are less privileged. Her
message is hard to hear, because it claims that what women have in
common is that they are all victims. MacKinnon looks straight at
what happens to the least powerful women in our society, and then
appeals to those moments in which powerful women share their vul-
nerability. Although different women are affected in different ways, all
women, MacKinnon argues, lose because sex means male dominance
in our society.
Women have been uncertain whether legal tools can be devised
that cannot be used against them. It has been hard to make specific
suggestions for change precisely because the ways in which women are
subordinated are so various and so pervasive. Can equal opportunity
for women who can make it on male terms be preserved if other
women, more economically vulnerable women, persuade the courts
that their interests deserve special protection?25 Will laws banning
pornography be turned against lesbians or heterosexual women who
are trying to define a new, more empowering women's sexuality?26 Is
there a way to protect a woman's reproductive freedom without deni-
grating those women who find their only source of self-respect in
motherhood and pregnancy?2 7
MacKinnon might respond that these are false dilemmas, created
by the effort to maintain credibility by sounding neutral (p. 165). The
way to ensure that the tools of law are not used against you is to insist
on being heard on your own terms.
25. Thus feminists disagreed over the appropriate resolution in a case challenging a state
statute that required employers to provide women with an unpaid maternity leave. California
Fed. Say. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 693-94. Some saw the statute as the beginning of
a new wave of protectionist legislation based on stereotypical, or overgeneralized views of
women. Others thought it a necessary protection if women, like men, were to combine the exer-
cise of their reproductive rights with work.
26. This fear was expressed in an amicus brief opposing the MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance.
Brief Amici Curiae of the Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce at 29-32, American Booksellers,
Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (No. 84-3147), affd. 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). See also
Ellis, I'm Black and Blue from the Rolling Stones and I'm Not Sure How I Feel About It: Pornog-
raphy and the Feminist Imagination, SOCIALIST REV., May-Aug. 1984, at 103.
27. See K. LJKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).
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